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Abstract 
Increasing resource efficiency can potentially deliver important economic and environ-
mental benefits. Many of these benefits are regularly foregone because the financial sec-
tor’s capacity to adequately take the opportunities and risks arising from resource utiliza-
tion and related climate change aspects into account has so far remained relatively unde-
veloped. Focusing on the case of Germany, a number of barriers to the inclusion of re-
source efficiency and climate change aspects into financial services' considerations are 
presented. Corresponding measures for improving the capacity of the financial sector to 
better integrate resource efficiency considerations and climate change related risks into its 
operating procedures are introduced. The measures encompass the areas of risk control-
ling, company reporting, institutional reporting requirements, as well as additional sup-
porting measures. 
Keywords: resource efficiency; climate change; financial; risk controlling; reporting re-
quirements; policy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Financial market regulation can significantly contribute towards incentivising firms to produce in 
less polluting and more resource efficient ways. The concurrent financial, economic and envi-
ronmental crises open up possibilities for a better alignment of the different policy fields con-
cerned. Taking Germany as an example, we show how policy makers can shape the incentive 
structures of financial market actors towards a greater consideration of climate risks and resource 
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efficiency. From a macro-economic perspective the financial sector could make an important 
contribution towards reaching the ambitious targets for rising resource efficiency. In order to 
reach these targets, massive investments in resource efficient and thus more climate friendly 
technologies will be necessary (see e.g. BMU and Roland Berger, 2008). However, if resource 
efficiency is not given the necessary consideration in investment and financing decisions, the 
potential for resource efficiency improvements cannot be fully realized.  
In the following section we will explain how anthropogenic resource consumption and climate 
change are interrelated. We will also discuss the benefits and limitations of increasing resource 
efficiency. In Section 3 we will then analyse how financial companies currently take the issues of 
climate change risks and of resource efficiency and conservation into account. In doing so, we 
will draw comparisons between carbon and general resource performance factors that financial 
market actors might want to consider when assessing firms. Following this, in Section 4, we will 
describe the professional circumstances and ethical considerations that have formed the back-
ground conditions for the policy recommendations in the subsequent chapters. In Section 5 we 
will discuss barriers to the inclusion of resource efficiency considerations by the financial service 
industry and propose a number of strategies for addressing them. These strategies touch upon 
issues of risk controlling, company reporting and institutional reporting requirements. The advo-
cated policy mix will then be completed with a number of supporting measures in Section 6.  
We focus mainly on how to modify existing financial sector regulation in Germany in order to 
induce financial services firms to consider resource efficiency factors more strongly in their in-
vestment and lending decisions. Where applicable, we also refer to possibilities for integrating 
climate change related risk in such decision-making. In order to be as concrete as possible we 
only consider the case of Germany here. However, it would certainly be of interest to start a de-
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bate on the commonalities and differences of various regulatory frameworks for financial markets 
and their implications for potential reforms targeted towards achieving higher resource efficiency. 
 
2. Promises and Pitfalls of Resource Efficiency 
 
The use of natural resources, including energy sources, is the major driving force behind anthro-
pogenic climate change and biodiversity loss. Energy and material use are closely interlinked, as 
energy is needed at all stages of the value chain, from resource extraction to consumption and, 
ultimately, waste management. Since all inputs into the industrial metabolism will eventually 
become outputs, strategies for increasing resource efficiency are more holistic approaches to-
wards reducing environmental impacts than just focussing on specific problems on the output 
side, like carbon emissions (see Schmidt-Bleek, 1994 and 2009). Often, end-of-pipe technologies 
designed to reduce emissions actually result in even more energy and resource consumption1. In 
contrast to this, cutting down on material input leads to a reduction in energy input and a corre-
sponding reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Thus, companies can substantially re-
duce their GHG emissions by increasing their resource efficiency. The concept of resource 
productivity can be very appealing for businesses as it shifts the focus from spending money on 
technical efforts for cleaning up wastes and emissions to saving money by spending less on natu-
ral resource inputs2. One can also increase competitiveness by cutting down on materials costs. 
Businesses can become more resilient by raising their resource productivity and thereby shielding 
themselves against price hikes and resource bottlenecks. The systemic effects of this approach are 
                                                
1 Catalytic converters for cars are a prominent example in this regard. 
2 Businesses pay three times for waste products: from the extraction of raw materials over proces-
sing to waste management or disposal. 
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not only limited to the activity of the individual firm in question but extends to the entire value 
chain in which the life cycle of a product or service is embedded.  
From a micro-economic perspective one could talk of a win-win situation between business and 
the environment (Weizsäcker et al., 1997). However, this relation becomes more subject to com-
plex interdependencies at the macro level.  
Basically, the concept of “resource efficiency” refers to producing the same (or increased) 
amount of an output Y with a decreased (or the same) amount of an input X; therefore, it can be 
deemed a polymorphic concept (Aamodt and Nygård, 1995; Schmidt-Bleek, 1994, 2009; Seiler-
Hausmann et al., 2005; Sloman, 2010). However, different value systems, preferences and theo-
ries of physical or social processes can lead to highly divergent assessments of the degree to 
which a resource is being efficiently utilized. Thus, the practical meaning of resource efficiency 
would remain rather void without specifying the content of these input and output variables. Alt-
hough resource efficiency can be subject to very diverse practical interpretations, it is certainly a 
compelling policy objective: 
 
i. Resource efficiency for reasons of absolute resource scarcity: the deposits of non-
renewable resources can eventually become subject to depletion or their extraction may 
become more costly with time, which will result in rising market prices (Görlach and 
Schmidt, 2009). 
 
ii. Resource efficiency for micro-economic reasons: a major share of the manufacturing in-
dustry’s total costs is due to material requirements. With increased resource efficiency 
factor productivity rises and companies can improve their competitiveness by reducing 
costs. Therefore, the efficient utilization of resources can be of decisive importance for a 
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business in order to remain competitive (ADL et al., 2005; Liedtke, 2005; Rennings et al., 
2008; Ayres and Warr, 2009). 
 
iii. Resource efficiency for macro-economic reasons: when resources are only available to a 
limited extent on a state's territory, a more efficient use of resources can positively affect 
the trade balance. This can support the economy’s resilience to external shocks by allevi-
ating the impact of fluctuations in commodity prices (Bleischwitz et al., 2009). 
 
iv. Resource efficiency as a contribution against climate change and for general environmen-
tal reasons: economic activities are often accompanied by enormous material flows. Re-
source extraction, refinement, transport, utilization, and disposal contribute significantly 
to the emission of GHGs and other undesirable environmental effects (see Bringezu and 
Bleischwitz, 2009; Rockström, 2010). 
 
v. Resource efficiency for reasons of global distributional and intergenerational justice: the 
utilization of the earth's resources is unevenly distributed, both with regard to the present 
situation and with regard to future generations. This has led to calls for a more equitable 
arrangement (see e.g. Schmidt-Bleek, 1994, 2008). 
 
vi. Resource efficiency as a means of conflict prevention: if increased resource efficiency 
leads to reductions in absolute resource demand, it can help to prevent conflicts that might 
otherwise arise from the “scramble for resources” (see e.g. Bleischwitz and Bringezu, 
2008).  
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Increasing resource efficiency can – ceterus paribus – help to reduce resource consumption. 
However, due to the rebound effect, some of the savings from more resource efficiency are offset 
by increased utilization. Sometimes this might even reach a situation known as the Jevons para-
dox: the actual efficiency savings are rendered negative by increased utilization (Binswanger, 
2001; Polimeni, 2009; Meyer, 2009). Because increases in resource efficiency spur economic 
growth, and economic growth in turn spurs demand for resources, savings in resource efficiency 
can easily be offset by growth-induced overall consumption increases.   
Resource efficiency in itself would need to continuously increase faster than the expansion of the 
economy takes place in order to reach an absolute decoupling of welfare development from mate-
rial throughput. So far only a relative decoupling has taken place; an absolute decoupling would 
probably require far-reaching changes across many of the parameters that constitute our modern 
economies (Schmidt-Bleek 1994; Weizsäcker et al., 1997; Daly, 2004; Jackson, 2009).  
Recent strategy papers by international organisations advocate for less environmentally damaging 
industrial trajectories and emphasize the importance of raising resource and carbon productivity 
(European Commission, 2011; OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2011). However, the linkage between mate-
rial and energy consumption has so far failed to receive much public attention. 
 
3. Status quo: financial companies’ consideration of climate change risks and of resource 
efficiency and conservation 
 
Huge potentials for increases in resource efficiency remain unexplored because financial service 
providers usually do not sufficiently consider resource efficiency aspects as part of their invest-
ment and lending criteria.  
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We start from the assumption that the financial sector usually only shows interest in natural re-
source conservation if it pays off in monetary terms, meaning it either contributes towards mak-
ing a profit or towards reducing risks. Of course, there are also exceptions from the rule. Some 
financial services operators might offer green investment due to genuine ethical considerations3.  
There is some evidence that capital markets already reward the overall risk reduction associated 
with improved environmental performance, which is due to more efficient resource utilization 
and lower risks from potential future regulation and litigation.  
Conducting a study of 267 US firms, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) found that financial markets 
reward firms for better environmental risk management. This reward comes mainly in the form of 
a reduction in the cost of equity. With regard to debt capital, the relation is not as straight forward. 
Increased environmental risk management is positively associated with the cost of debt capital. 
However, at the same time firms are allowed to take on increased leverage. This helps to increase 
tax subsidies and, potentially, to outperform competitors. Sharfman and Fernando conclude that 
an improved environmental risk management strategy does not only result in increased resource 
efficiency but also in an improved risk profile vis a vis financial markets. 
Ambec and Lanoie (2008) also argue that greener firms might be able to enjoy lower costs of 
capital. One reasons is that they have easier access to capital markets by virtue of their inclusion 
in the portfolios of “green” or ethical mutual funds. Another reason is that greener companies can 
borrow more easily from banks. Many banks now have experts evaluating the environmental per-
formance of borrowers. These experts in particular scrutinize potential liabilities that could arise 
from the contamination of assets. Beyond this, shareholders might respond to information on the 
environmental performance of companies by adjusting their preferences and thereby causing 
changes in the costs of capital. Conducting a meta-analysis of 16 portfolio analyses, 14 event 
                                                
3 In particular customer-held cooperative banks like GLS Bank or the non-publicly traded Triodos 
Bank seem to exhibit genuine ethical commitment. 
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studies and 12 long-term studies, Ambec and Lanoie conclude that the large majority of these 
studies "show that better environmental performance is associated with better financial perfor-
mance (or at least not worse)". Supporting this, the Carbon Disclosure Project’s (2011) Global 
500 Report 2011 “suggests a strong correlation between higher financial performance and good 
climate change disclosure and performance“. 
Particularly large and diversified institutional investors like pension funds, mutual funds and in-
surance companies (“Universal Owners”) have an interest in reducing their exposure to environ-
mental damage. Due to their immense power in contemporary capitalism, the policies adopted by 
financial companies can exert massive influence on manufacturers. Glattfelder (2010) analysed 
the global ownership network of transnational corporations (TNCs). He shows that the world’s 
top economic actors are highly interconnected. Furthermore, “most of the top power-holders are 
financial intermediaries“. Such a high degree of diversification and interconnectivity will find its 
expression in specific interest structures. A fully-fledged discussion of this interest structure is 
beyond the scope of this article. However, a recent joint report by the investor initiative Princi-
ples for Responsible Investment (PRI) and the United Nations Environmental Programme Fi-
nance Initiative (UNEP FI) is suggestive of how such an interest structure might unfold with re-
gard to certain environmental externalities: Because of “Universal Owner’s” huge and wide-
spread portfolios a “company’s [environmental] externalities can damage the profitability of oth-
er portfolio companies, adversely affecting other investments, and hence overall market return” 
(PRI Association and UNEP FI, 2011). Therefore, an interest in influencing companies to mini-
mize certain environmental externalities might arise.   
However, it is clear that environmental and resource efficiency aspects are not transparent and 
comparable enough, yet, to take them fully into account. Making the resource efficiency perfor-
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mance of companies more amenable to systematic comparisons and evaluations should help to 
direct investment flows into more resource efficient directions.  
Recently, financial companies have started to pay considerable attention to climate change related 
risks. In comparison, awareness of resource efficiency and conservation issues is still in its infan-
cy. In the following we will discuss some of these climate change related aspects, as resource 
consumption and climate change are strongly interlinked. We suggest that financial companies’ 
behaviour towards climate change issues can be used partly as a blueprint and partly as a con-
trasting picture for an analysis of possible incentives for increasing resource efficiency. 
 
Financial companies’ consideration of climate change risks 
 
Financial companies are exposed to climate change risks in various ways. Insurers of homes and 
businesses are directly exposed to these risks while banks or other investors can be indirectly 
affected when climate-related risks cause loans to go bad or share prices to fall. While the field of 
CSR is largely driven by companies’ concern about their reputation, corporate approaches to cli-
mate change are strongly shaped by pressures from investors (Newell and Paterson, 2010).  
Companies see themselves confronted with different types of risks arising from climate change. 
Attention focuses on three different types of risks (see e.g. International Finance Corporation, 
2010): 
i. Risks arising from firms’ active contribution to climate change, e.g. in the form of lit-
igation or reputational losses. Reputational losses might impinge on access to im-
portant markets and litigation can become costly.  
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ii. Risks arising from firms’ dependence on activities that contribute towards climate 
change, e.g. in the form of price hikes for fossil fuels or emission permits or the fail-
ure to anticipate new government regulation early enough in advance. 
iii. Risks arising from firms’ exposure to the impacts of climate change. There is a wide 
array of weather-related risks that might impinge on businesses’ ability to pay back 
their loans. As a consequence, they might consider to withdraw from coasts or in-
creasingly flood-prone rivers or to adapt architectural designs in order to prepare for 
increased risks from hurricanes. More and more companies in climate sensitive sec-
tors such as tourism or agriculture are including climate change scenarios in their stra-
tegic calculations. 
Furthermore, a lack of responsiveness to the opportunities arising from decarbonisation also har-
bours the risk of foregoing potential new market opportunities. 
A number of large multi-national companies do respond to mounting pressure to deliver on their 
green rhetoric and try to reduce environmental liabilities. However, the great number of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) does not see climate change or resource conservation as 
issues to be addressed by their operational activities. Neither are they under as much scrutiny as 
the multi-nationals nor do they command over the resources to comply with demanding standards 
or to launch elaborated PR campaigns (Newell and Paterson, 2010). Where individual companies 
would otherwise lack incentives to enhance their climate and resource performance, financial 
companies could potentially leverage some influence. 
According to Newell and Paterson (2010), the financial community has adopted four sets of strat-
egies in response to climate change:  
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i. Withdraw: Some insurance providers have simply withdrawn coverage from some re-
gions and clients. 
ii. Risk management: This can involve limiting, sharing, pooling or hedging the risks of 
climate impacts. 
iii. Investment in action on climate change: The response to the danger of reputational 
losses comes largely in the form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) schemes. 
This might entail engaging one’s critics and perhaps even forming partnerships with 
them. Some companies seem to be involved in the funding of climate adaption pro-
jects. Another approach to CSR is building up a climate portfolio. J.P. Morgan, for 
example, simply bought up Climate Care, one of the largest producers of carbon-
offset credits. Many leading financial actors have declared themselves ‘carbon neutral’ 
as part of their CSR strategy. 
iv. Demanding transparency and emissions reductions from companies: Large institution-
al investors have started to pressure companies to be transparent about their emissions 
and to limit or reduce them.   
Concrete actions by financial companies have been varied: Barclays Capital, for example, already 
screens its investments along the lines of climate change risks. HSBC, the largest bank in emerg-
ing markets, is carefully observing the effect climate changes might have on the economies where 
it invests. Responding to shareholder pressure, J.P. Morgan has actually started assessing the fi-
nancial risks associated with GHG emissions in loan evaluations (Newell and Paterson, 2010; 
HSBC, 2009).  
The benchmarking of companies’ carbon emissions was initially developed by members of 
UNEP FI. Such benchmarking enables investors to use data on emissions, which they can base 
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their investment decisions on. One assumption is that even without taking climate change into 
account, regulatory and other risks make more CO2 intensive companies riskier than less inten-
sive companies (Newell and Paterson, 2010). We suggest that this assumption could be extended 
to companies’ dependence on scarce resources as well as with regard to the impact of their activi-
ties on natural resource depletion.   
Until now, insurers in the US are not subject to insurer-specific obligations regarding the disclo-
sure of climate change risks. Only a minority of them has climate change policies in place (Ceres, 
2011). However, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) already forces stock-listed 
companies to disclose their CO2-intensity. Specifically, potential impacts of legislation, regula-
tion, international accords, indirect consequences of regulation, business trends, and physical 
impacts of climate change may trigger disclosure requirements (Environmental Leader, 2010; 
Newell and Paterson, 2010; SEC, 2010).  
In Germany, the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) requires stock exchange listed compa-
nies to consider climate risk in their risk management and to disclose such risks in their annual 
reports and their sales prospectuses. Similar obligations apply for investment funds. However, 
similar to the situation in the US, in most cases it would be difficult for litigant investors to prove 
causality in front of a court (Holz, 2010). 
Although there are certain initial requirements for reporting on climate risks in the USA as well 
as in Germany, there are as of yet no obligations for systematic reporting. Therefore, it is far from 
astonishing that a recent survey among financial institutions from around the world found that 
climate risks related information is so far insufficient for adequate approaches to risk manage-
ment (Sustainable Business Institute and UNEP Finance Initiative, 2011).  
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Financial companies’ consideration of resource efficiency and conservation 
We argue that the risks structure arising from companies’ resource use can be usefully compared 
to the risks arising from carbon emissions. 
This is illustrated in table 1. 
Tab. 1: Overview of analogies between risks arising from resource use and carbon emissions 
Type of risk Carbon emissions Resources use 
Risks that arise regardless of 
one’s own contribution (exo-
genous). 
Weather risks. Weather risks, habitat loss, resource 
conflicts. 
 
Potential litigation and/or 
reputational losses.  
 
Risks arising from firms’ active 
contribution to climate change. 
Risks arising from firms’ direct or 
indirect contribution to climate 
change, habitat loss and resource con-
flicts.  
Because resources are often simply 
bought on the (rather anonymous) 
world market, the perceived risk of 
liabilities is low. However, companies 
are more and more held morally re-
sponsible in case they neglect the 
consequences of their resource acqui-
sition patterns. This can translate in 
companies being perceived as “clean-
er” or “dirtier” than others. These risks 
vary substantively depending on the 
class of products concerned (branded 
sports apparel is a product class more 
sensitive to reputational losses than 
copper tubes). 
 
 
Risks arising from dependence 
on certain acitivities. 
 
Price hikes for fossil fuels or emis-
sion permits or the failure to antici-
pate new government regulation (e.g. 
emission cap adjustments) early 
enough in advance. 
 
Price hikes or bottlenecks (for political 
reasons or because of absolute scarci-
ty) for energy and material resources 
more generally or emission permits or 
the failure to anticipate new govern-
ment regulation (e.g. resource taxes, 
green procurement) early enough in 
advance. 
 
Foregoing of new market 
opportunities. 
 
Due to lack of responsiveness to the 
opportunities arising from decarbon-
isation. 
 
Due to lack of responsiveness to the 
opportunities arising from decarboni-
sation and dematerialisation. 
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Considering these analogies, the financial sector is so far not systematically taking into account 
the risks and opportunities that arise from differences in firms’ resource productivity and depend-
ence. 
According to qualitative interviews conducted by Görlach and Zvedov (2010) within the frame-
work of our overarching research project, resource efficiency considerations do not play a role in 
German banks’ lending activities yet. This appears to be somewhat astonishing as for companies 
receiving credits resource efficiency is becoming more and more relevant for remaining competi-
tive (ADL et al. 2005; Modi and Mishra, 2011).  
Even with regard to risk assessment, where qualitative aspects can also play a role, the topic is 
hardly considered; systematic procedures or binding obligations are lacking.  
With regard to equity investments, there are already a number of “green funds” catering for the 
German market that explicitly consider resource efficiency as part of their investment criteria (see 
e.g. GLS Bank, 2011; Umweltinvestmentfonds.de, 2011).    
However, a lack of systematic and comparable resource efficiency related reporting requirements 
makes it relatively difficult for investors to take such considerations into account.  
4. Writing Policy: Concrete Steps  
This article is based on a policy paper commissioned by the German Federal Environment Agen-
cy (UBA) and the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nu-
clear Safety. We aim at providing the greatest transparency with regard to how we arrived at our 
policy proposals. However, policy analysis as conducted by environmental ‘think tanks’ can be 
likened to a ‚clinical profession’ along the lines of medicine, psychology or law, where the cogni-
tive disposition of the analyst, the shared epistemology of policy practitioners and the corre-
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sponding tacit knowledge all have a role to play (Geva-May, 2005). Policy analyses commis-
sioned by a ministry or a federal agency are, of course, quite distinct from those written for pure-
ly academic purposes. As they aim at formulating new policies or modifying existing ones, the 
main emphasis is on problem definition, the plausible consequences of policies, and – last but not 
least – their political feasibility. In this vein, Greenberg (2007) suggests six criteria for judging 
environmental policy proposals commissioned by public institutions:  
i.anticipated reactions by politicians and public officials,  
ii.anticipated reactions by the general public and interests groups such as non-governmental 
organisations, industry and the media, 
iii.environmental and health aspects, 
iv.short and long term economic costs and benefits, 
v.normative aspects, 
vi.flexibility and time pressure.   
Bearing these criteria in mind, we combined a literature review with qualitative expert interviews 
(Görlach and Zvedov, 2010) in order to generate an empirical basis for our policy proposals. The 
proposals were then subjected to evaluation by an expert workshop. The final selection of the 
instruments was taken in association with the clients, i.e. the German Federal Environment 
Agency (UBA) and the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU). The results should therefore, like all policy recommendations, be inter-
preted as hybrids of science and politics (on research institutes as hybrid organizations see 
Gulbrandsen, 2011).  
5. Barriers to the Inclusion of Resource Efficiency Considerations by the Financial Service 
Industry and Strategies for Addressing Them 
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In the following we will analyse some major barriers to the inclusion of resource efficiency con-
siderations by the financial service industry. Based on this, we will make some pragmatic pro-
posals on how to slightly modify extant incentives structures so that financial market actors are 
more likely to pay attention to the benefits of resource efficient production. 
The marginal role of resource efficiency and related reporting in the financial sector can be at-
tributed to the following reasons: 
i. Central stakeholders do not demand a resource related reporting from their customers. 
ii. The economic risks and opportunities associated with resource related questions have not 
yet been given sufficient consideration (Görlach and Schmidt, 2010). 
iii. Financial service firms do not have concrete incentives and obligations to integrate the re-
source utilization of their customers into their operational activities, in particularly not in-
to their risk management. 
One might argue that the price signals from carbon and commodity markets should provide suffi-
cient incentives for companies to adjust their activities in the direction of more resource efficien-
cy and less carbon intensity. However, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
is a politically instituted market whose emission prices are heavily dependent on the politically 
determined quantity of certificates. These politically determined prices do not reflect climate spe-
cific portfolio risks. Commodity prices also fail to reflect future scarcity by not accurately ac-
counting for ecological thresholds and irreversibilities in depleting natural capital. Also, if envi-
ronmental externalities were internalised, commodity prices would be much higher (Neumayer, 
2000). Future regulatory developments might well seek to internalize externalities, possibly pro-
voking commodity price hikes. 
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The existence of comprehensive, comparable and reliable information on the resource utilization 
by companies is a fundamental prerequisite for a systematic consideration of resource efficiency 
aspects on part of the financial sector. Here, financial service firms depend on the data reported 
by the companies. So far, initiatives for systematically surveying resource specific data have nei-
ther been clearly focused on the needs of the financial industry nor have they been particularly 
successful in their implementation (see e.g. Bierter et al., 2001). 
Usually, firms only report selectively within the framework of environmental and sustainability 
reporting. Furthermore the reported data is not sufficiently homogenous to be amenable to sys-
tematic comparisons. Firms do not have concrete incentives to reveal information on their re-
source utilization in an adequate quality, among other reasons because: 
i. adequate resource related reporting requires additional time and resources while not 
providing tangible benefits; 
ii. there are no uniform reporting standards with sufficiently meaningful and verifiable indi-
cators.  
On the other hand, there is a very concrete disincentive to reveal too much information on re-
source utilization as it is considered to be of strategic value. 
In the following sections we will analyse different barriers to the inclusion of resource efficiency 
considerations by the financial services industry and propose approaches for overcoming these. 
We limit our analysis to the case of Germany. However, due to important cross-national similari-
ties in financial market institutions we expect our analysis to be relevant in other countries as 
well. 
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5.1. Risk controlling 
Risk controlling features belong to the central functions of financial services firms and directly 
impinge on decisions regarding conditions and volumes of financing as well as on the strategic 
orientation of firm operations. So far risk controlling is not sufficiently connected to relevant risk 
related variables concerning resource or climate aspects.  
The models that banks usually employ for company evaluation do not sufficiently reflect the 
causal relations between resource utilization and climate impacts and possibly related uncertain-
ties and risks. This is because only frequentistic approaches are obligatory. Standard evaluations 
are based on historical data in the following:  
i. fundamental company evaluation (in discounted cash flow models as well as in multiple 
ratings (see Onischka and Schweneke, 2008)), 
ii. common credit rating systems within banks, 
iii. assessments by rating agencies, 
iv. the different models for the quantification of credit and market risks according to Basel 
II.4 
When risk contributions resulting from resource utilization and climate change are to be taken 
into account, a purely empirically based risk exposure analysis without prospective adjustments 
cannot do justice to the factors at hand. Due to its context sensitivity the historical data simply 
cannot be relied on (Onischka, 2008; Bundesregierung, 2008).  
                                                
4 Basel III didn’t bring direct changes regarding climate or resource related risks as the focus was 
on liquidity and solvency risks. 
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Expert-based approaches can factor in potential future developments into the evaluation. These 
are sometimes employed when the credit volume is particularly large. However, the reliance on 
individual experts in such cases still does not boil down to a systematic consideration of resource 
related risks. Therefore, there is still a tendency of under-estimating these risks. 
 
Recommended Strategy 
We argue that the most effective strategy for approaching this issue would be to modify the regu-
latory framework. However, such a more comprehensive step might not be politically feasible at 
the moment. Therefore, we start with some suggestions for taking better advantage of the possi-
bilities within the existing regulatory framework. 
i. Concrete recommendations for taking better advantage of the possibilities within the ex-
isting regulatory framework 
a. Haircuts5: based on the market value of the securities one could perform asset-
related, general haircuts (Basel II No 133ff) in order to account for expected value 
losses due to resource utilization patterns. 
b. Rating agencies: the banking authorities could demand a stronger consideration of 
resource and climate risks in order to grant an operating license to rating agencies 
(Basel II No. 90 ff.).  
c. IRB: one could use an internal rating-based approach (IRB) in order to either 
quantitatively evaluate the future impact of resource utilization on project success, 
                                                
5 When an asset is being used as a collateral, a percentage is subtracted from its market value in 
order to reflect the risk associated with holding the asset. The percentage subtracted is called a 
haircut. The size of the haircut depends on the perceived riskiness of the asset. 
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profitability etc. or qualitatively evaluate according to criteria such as strategic po-
sitioning, market analysis or regulation scenarios. 
 
ii. Concrete recommendations for a modification of the existing regulatory framework 
a. Opening clauses for alternative market-based risk models: many general and spe-
cific regulations ask for the verification and stress tests of processes and methods 
on the basis of historical data. The exclusive focus on historical data leads to an 
underestimation of resource and climate related risks. The same goes for market 
price models that are used for the calculation of haircuts for securities or for the 
probability of default (PD) with the IRB. Insofar as one deems it desirable to con-
tinue using vector autoregressive (VAR) models one would need to find possibili-
ties for integrating simulations of resource price and climate trends on the basis of 
historical data, particularly with regard to the probability of sudden shocks. A first 
step should be the introduction of opening clauses for alternative market price 
models.  
b. Institution of new market-based risk models: with reference to Basel II only fre-
quentistic approaches are being used. In contrast to the aforementioned opening 
clauses one could also make alternative approaches obligatory, at least for specific 
applications or risks. Some promising approaches for the management of risks are 
already being developed within the scholarly community (Jaeger et al., 2003, 
Krause, 2007, Günther et al., 2006, Mercer, 2011). Such new methods for the 
quantification and evaluation of risks should not be exclusively based on historical 
data but should also aim to take into account future developments to the extent 
that it is possible. Here, further model building and tests are necessary before such 
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models can be integrated within the regulatory framework. The academic commu-
nity as well as the financial industry, e.g. the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), could contribute significantly to the development of such models.  
c. Limitation of netting positions: resource and climate specific risks usually add to 
the conventional market and credit risks and increase the overall risks. Of course, 
there are winners as well as losers resulting from such a modification of risk as-
sessments. However, because these risks can be very heterogeneous over time and 
across sectors a netting of risk contributions only makes sense to a certain extent 
(Steinbrügge, 2007). At the moment it is possible to perform a netting of the 
claims and liabilities of either the same counterparty or of balance sheet positions. 
Consequently, only the net position is used to calculate the debt-equity ratio (Basel 
II No. 188 and 309). A netting can lead to uncovered risks when claims and liabili-
ties are allocated the same risk class on the basis of the current approach but 
would fall into different classes if resource and climate risks were part of the cal-
culation. Consequently, it would be worth considering examining any relevant dif-
ferences with regard to operating sites, sectors, etc., as well as the climate and re-
source risk exposure of each position prior to a netting. Perhaps a limitation of net-
tings to positions within the same sector would also do. As an alternative, one 
could consider applying a small haircut to the positions that are to be netted. 
d. Explicitly addressing risks related to resources, climate and the environment in the 
regulatory framework: in the extant regulatory framework explicit risk categories 
are not clearly mentioned. However, it would be a possibility to directly address 
risks relating to resources, climate and the environment in the regulatory frame-
work. This means the general requirements for risk management would demand 
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that such risks also be covered. In the beginning, the concrete operational imple-
mentation would not need to be addressed. The explicit mentioning of such risks 
would already be a clear signal to the financial sector that the regulator deems 
such risks to be of significance. This could deliver an impetus to the financial sec-
tor to initiate corresponding considerations and developments.   
If one wants to go beyond the possibilities that are available within the scope of the implementa-
tion of EU law it would be necessary to seek European and / or international coordination. Since 
the German government and the EU orient their regulation according to the proposals emanating 
from international expert discussions, de facto it is necessary to insert regulatory reform pro-
posals into such expert discussions. 
The aforementioned proposals differ with regard to their impact on resource efficiency improve-
ments and with regard to the resistance that can be expected from the financial industry, financial 
authorities and the financial expert community. 
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Tab. 2: Overview of specific proposals for the regulation of the financial industry’s risk management 
Proposal 
Temporal implemen-
tation corridor  
Impact on resource 
efficiency improve-
ments  
Expected resistance  
1. Recommendations in the frame of the existing regulatory framework 
I) hair cuts  short term  low  medium  
Ii) rating agencies  short term  high  low  
iii) IRB  mid to long term  medium  high  
2. Recommendations for a modification of the existing regulatory framework  
iv) opening clauses  short to mid term  medium  low to medium  
v) new market-based risk 
models  
long term  high  high  
vi) netting  mid to long term  low  high  
vii) mandatory declara-
tions of resource related 
risks  
mid term  medium  low  
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5.2. Company reporting 
The existing practice of company reporting with regard to resource efficiency can be improved 
by including non-financial performance indicators in reporting requirements. 
Any elaboration of possible strategies towards that direction needs to depart from a survey of the 
status quo. The following aspects characterize the latter: 
i. Current reporting requirements are insufficient: although relevant laws already explicitly 
demand that non-financial key performance indicators (KPI) be integrated into the com-
pany report, most companies present such information - if at all - separately in the volun-
tary part of the company report, with significant differences regarding content and credi-
bility. 
 
ii. Auditing of non-financial indicators is not common: non-financial indicators can contain 
important information with regard to an understanding of the situation and the likely de-
velopment of a company, and to the chances and risks emanating from climate change and 
resource utilization aspects. According to the logic of current reporting requirements all 
KPI should be subject to auditing and therefore should belong to the auditable part of the 
company report, which can be understood as an instrument of creditor protection (Baetge, 
2008).  
 
iii. Definitions of performance indicators are missing: currently, there is a lack of binding 
non-financial performance indicators that could express a company’s resource utilization. 
So far there have been several attempts by different actors to define sector wide KPIs  
(Hesse, 2007; DVFA, 2007a,b; DEFRA, 2006). However, these indicator sets are either  
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too abstract and general, or in parts too comprehensive for practical implementation or 
conceptualized from the perspective of specific applications (e.g. fundamental financial 
analysis). Therefore, important prerequisites for a balanced cross-sector application are 
missing. As a result, an immediate implementation of such indicator sets cannot be rec-
ommended. However, parts of them can be used in order to create sector-specific KPIs. 
 
iv. Companies have a lot of leeway: currently it is up to the individual companies whether 
they choose to include one of the aforementioned KPIs, define new KPI sets, or do not in-
clude any at all. This means that the companies decide if and how non-financial perfor-
mance indicators are included in their reporting. 
 
Recommendations for increasing resource efficiency 
In order to overcome the aforementioned barriers, it is necessary 
i. to either introduce an obligation for companies to publish explicitly defined resource re-
lated KPIs in their reporting, 
ii. or to achieve the development of a professional standard that defines the requirements for 
financial and non-financial KPIs in company reporting. 
Both are only possible against the background of a dedicated and detailed framework for resource 
and sustainability reporting. 
It is therefore necessary to elaborate, either via self- or government regulation a catalogue of 
basic indicators that should be reported across sectors. In that way it will be possible to bench-
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mark different companies against each other. From a long term perspective, in order to guarantee 
the international comparability of company reporting, it would be desirable to work towards an 
internationally acknowledged standard.  
 
5.3. Institutional reporting requirements 
From a juridical point of view, the stock exchanges in Germany are public institutions, i.e. they 
are governed by public law. However due to self-administration they are de facto governed by a 
mix of private and public law. While the organizational structure of the different stock exchange 
bodies and their duties and obligations are prescribed by public law, the implementation remains 
in the hands of a private stock company, e.g. Deutsche Börse AG. That means that the public 
stock exchanges are run by private companies und not by the government itself (Tolkmitt, 2007).   
Each stock exchange differentiates between different market segments for which there are differ-
ent conditions for listings, transparency and reporting obligations and monitoring and regulation 
regimes. A higher market segment is supposed to signal to investors that a company is of higher 
“quality”. The categorization in a higher market segment, particularly the prime standards, is also 
a condition for the inclusion in stock indices, e.g. the DAX.6 
For companies the differences in transparency and reporting requirements are the central differ-
ence between the market segments (see Tab. 2).   
  
                                                
6 Blue chip stock market index consisting of the 30 major German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change 
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Tab. 2: Selected transparency and publication requirements according to market 
Standard  General Standard  Prime Standard  
. Annual report/ semi-
annual report  
. Simple ad-hoc-
notifications  
. Annual report / semi-
annual report within 
four months 
. Quarterly reports  
. Extended ad-hoc notifi-
cations in German  
. Declaration of direc-
tor’s dealings  
. Mandatory offer after 
change of control 
 
. Annual financial state-
ment according to in-
ternational accounting 
standards (IFRS/IAS or 
US-GAAP)  
. Detailed quarterly re-
ports according to the 
guidelines defined by 
the stock exchange 
rules. 
. Company calendar 
. At least one analyst 
conference per year  
. Ad-hoc notifications in 
English 
Source: own representation, adapted from Deutsche Börse AG, 2009 
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Recommendations for increasing recourse efficiency 
Considering the central role of stock market exchanges it would be a plausible approach to intro-
duce additional reporting requirements for market segments with high transparency obligations. 
This would mean that listed companies would need to reveal additional resource and climate rel-
evant information in addition to their current reporting requirements. As a result, financial service 
firms could include this information in their investment and financing decisions.  
 
6. Supporting Measures 
A significant increase in resource efficiency will be most likely when the different strategies are 
applied in a comprehensive and concerted fashion. In order to adequately complement this, addi-
tional supporting measures are necessary. For the coming years we deem the following support-
ing measures to be particularly relevant: 
i. Efficiency campaign: an efficiency campaign in cooperation with relevant financial mar-
ket related institutions could approach financial market actors in a targeted fashion and 
raise their awareness for issues of resource efficiency. 
ii. Federal Resource and Climate Data Institution: the introduction of a federal institution 
charged with the continuous development of methods, the surveying of resource and cli-
mate relevant data, inter-institutional cooperation and the satisfaction of further stake-
holder needs. 
iii. Commission of enquiry: a parliamentary commission of enquiry on resource efficiency 
and sustainability in the financial sector could analyse current and future challenges for 
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the financial sector and policy making and elaborate possible responses together with ex-
perts in matters of finance, economics, law, ecology and ethics.    
 
7. Conclusion 
The success of policy strategies for increasing resource efficiency will be limited as long as there 
is no sufficient steering of capital flows into resource efficient technologies and business models. 
In order for the financial sector to exert its influence on businesses in ways that motivate them to 
increase their resource efficiency, the following conditions need to be fulfilled: 
i. Companies need to provide sufficient and comparable information so that the potential fi-
nancial repercussions of their resource utilization can be evaluated. 
ii. Regulation must make it easier for financial service firms to include the risks and oppor-
tunities emanating from patterns of resource utilization in their evaluations. 
Although these are necessary conditions, they cannot guarantee a significant effect and need to be 
accompanied by additional supporting measures such as efficiency campaigns, institutions dedi-
cated to resource and climate issues and parliamentary commissions working towards financial 
sector reform.  
The main strategies could be implemented at a relatively low price for the government because 
only regulatory changes would need to be made. The supporting measures would be more costly, 
in particular the establishment of a Federal Resource and Climate Data Institution. For businesses, 
the regulatory burden would clearly increase. However, the transition from a “cowboy economy”, 
with seemingly unlimited resources, towards a “spaceman economy”, which is adjusted to the 
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reality of the earth’s finite resource base, will not proceed without demanding greater accounta-
bility from all those who profit from the extraction and utilization of resources (see Boulding, 
1966).  
With regard to the relation between economic costs and environmental benefits we cannot give 
precise estimates. The system to which our proposals pertain is very complex and the conse-
quences should be subject to highly dynamic and interdependent developments. In favour of our 
proposals we can say that increasing resource efficiency may not only deliver environmental but 
also economic benefits, not least in the form of increased resilience to resource price hikes and 
bottlenecks. More efficient and resilient companies can contribute to a more resilient overall 
economy. Furthermore, the incremental approach to reform helps to split uncertainties into man-
ageable chunks. 
The difficulty in the implementation of the main measures arises less from budgetary constraints 
than from the necessity for cross-ministerial coordination: Financial market policy needs to be 
coordinated with environmental policy (on the need for policy integration see also Hamdouch and 
Depret, 2010). In order for market actors to link the topics of finance and resource efficiency, 
politics must take that step first. 
Many analysts as well as public opinion have identified the urgent need for fundamental read-
justments in the regulation of financial markets (Krugman, 2008; Roubini and Mihm, 2010). At 
the same time, the dramatic environmental impacts of our current development model are in-
creasingly conceded. Moments of crisis also hold opportunities for reform, particularly when 
once sealed agreements again become objects of negotiation. Considering the depth of the current 
economic crisis and the correspondingly large scope of potential reform endeavours, we hope that 
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this contribution will help to stir debate and creative thinking on how to better align environmen-
tal policy with financial market regulation. 
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